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Modelling of human alarm handling response times: a case study of the
Ladbroke Grove rail accident in the UK
Neville A. Stantona* and Christopher Baberb
aErgonomics Research Group, School of Engineering and Design, Brunel University, Uxbridge,
Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK; bSchool of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, University of
Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
The purpose of the paper was to address the timeliness of the signaller’s intervention in
the Ladbroke Grove rail incident in the UK, as well as to consider the utility of human
performance time modelling more generally. Human performance response time
modelling is a critical area for Human Factors and Ergonomics research. This research
applied two approaches to the same problem to see if they arrived at the same
conclusion. The ﬁrst modelling approach used the alarm initiated activity (AIA) model.
This approach is useful for indicating general response times in emergency events, but it
cannot comment in detail on any speciﬁc case. The second modelling approach
employed a multi-modal critical path analysis (CPA) technique. The advantage of the
latter approach is that it can be used to model a speciﬁc incident on the basis of the
known factors from the accident inquiry. The results show that the AIA model
produced an estimated response time of 17 s, whereas the CPA model produced an
estimated response time of 19 s. This compares with the actual response time of the
signaller of 18 s. The response time data from both approaches are concordant and
suggest that the signaller’s response time in the Ladbroke Grove rail accident was
reasonable. This research has application to the modelling of human responses to
emergency events in all domains. Rather than the forensic reconstruction approach used
in this paper, the models could be used in a predictive manner to anticipate how long
human operators of safety-critical systems might take to respond in emergency
scenarios.
Keywords: response time; alarms; control room; performance modelling; emergency; rail
system
1. Introduction
1.1. The Ladbroke Grove rail incident
On 5 October 1999 at 08.06, a light commuter train left Paddington station from Platform
9 on route to Bedwyn in Wiltshire. Approximately 3 min later the train collided with a
high-speed train coming from the opposite direction at a combined speed of 130 mph
causing the deaths of 31 people, including the drivers of both trains. At the subsequent
inquiry led by Lord Cullen (Cullen 2000), one of the key questions was: ‘why did it take
the signaller in the Slough control room [responsible for that section of track] some 18 s to
*Corresponding author. Email: neville.stanton@brunel.ac.uk
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8 respond to the alarm advising him of an unauthorised track occupation?’ (italics added).
In his report, Cullen (2000) criticised the time taken by the signaller to respond, although
he did concede that an earlier response ‘could not have prevented the crash’ (Cullen 2000).
The point at issue was whether 18 s constitutes a reasonable time or whether one might
anticipate a much faster time. Certainly, if the response was simply a matter of hearing an
alarm and then pressing a button to cancel the alarm, then one might expect human
performance to be around 3–4 s. However, such a response time might miss crucial aspects
of signaller activity, e.g. determining an appropriate form of response as well as
performing that response.
In a recent paper addressing the underlying causes of the accident, Lawton and Ward
(2005) took a systems analysis perspective to identify potential latent conditions
contributing to the Ladbroke Grove accident. They reviewed witness statements and the
two reports produced by the enquiry that followed the event. The focus of the paper was
largely upon the driver of the light commuter train, to explain why he might have driven
through a red signal. Many factors were identiﬁed, such as those associated with driver
psychology (e.g. perceptual, attentional and psycho-motor abilities), the design of the rail
system (e.g. track layout, display interfaces, feedback and communications), the
organisation (e.g. safety management, training and system design) and system defences
(e.g. safety devices, signalling, policies and awareness of hazards). Using Reason’s (1990)
‘system pathogen’ model, Lawton and Ward (2005) suggested how these latent conditions
gave rise to the active failure (i.e. the driver passing the red signal). Taking their lead from
the Cullen report, the authors also questioned the timeliness of the signaller’s intervention
in the incident.
There are at least three approaches that could be taken to determine whether or not
Lord Cullen’s criticism of the signaller’s response time is justiﬁed. The ﬁrst approach
would be to recreate the conditions in a signal control room environment, to determine
how a range of signallers deal with the event (Farrington-Derby et al. 2006). This
approach could be criticised because, while participants may be encouraged to follow
standard operating procedures and thus perform to similar standards, the conditions in an
experiment may not reﬂect those of the real-life incident. The second approach would be
to use Klein et al.’s (1989) critical decision methodology, to interpret the activities of
the signaller in question (Walker et al. 2006). This approach could be criticised because
the event took place some years ago and therefore the recall of the signaller is likely to be
unreliable (particularly as the signaller has already had his account challenged and debated
in Court). A third approach would be to model response times of the signaller. It is this
latter approach that will be followed in this paper. In particular, the paper focuses on two
ways of achieving model response times: the ﬁrst considers response times for emergency
handling across a range of industries; the second develops a model of the signaller’s
probable action, given the known contextual factors and the description of events
provided by the Cullen Enquiry Reports. The two modelling approaches have the beneﬁt
of oﬀering independent data on how long it could reasonably be expected for people to
respond in an emergency situation.
1.2. Summary of the Ladbroke Grove incident
A light commuter train (with the headcode of IK20 on the signaller’s screen and called
train 1 in this paper) had passed a red signal called SN109 (indicated by the black circle at
the centre right of Figure 1) on the track out of Paddington station as if signal SN109 was
set to green, indicating that the train could proceed safely. A high-speed train (with the
424 N.A. Stanton and C. Baber
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headcode of 1A06 on the signaller’s screen and called train 2 in this paper) was coming
into Paddington from the opposite direction. An illustration of the direction of travel for
both trains is presented in Figure 1. The Ladbroke Grove rail junction has six tracks, three
of which are illustrated in Figure 1. The tracks are divided into segments, called track
circuits, which indicate the position of the train. Train 1 travelled through track circuits
GD, GE (passing signal 109 – the red signal), GF and GG as indicated by the arrow going
left in Figure 1, whilst train 2 travelled through track circuits MX, MY and MZ as
indicated by the arrow going right in Figure 1. The collision occurred where the black
rectangle is placed over the two intersecting sections of track.
The timing of events is taken from Lord Cullen’s report and presented below. The
timeline represents the events that were logged by the signaller’s workstation and, in this
extract, picks up the journey from the moment that train passed signal SN109, which was
set to red. The train driver should have waited at this signal until it turned green. The
paper by Lawton and Ward (2005) contains more details on the activities of the driver of
train 1, whereas the present paper focuses on the signaller.
08:08:29 – A ‘track circuit GE occupied IK20’ warning message is presented on the alarm
screen in the signaller’s workstation (see Figure 2 for a general picture of the workstation) and
auditory ‘tweet’ sounds (an auditory track occupation alarm referring to the same track circuit
GE occupation by train 1); at the same time a red line appears on the track layout on the track
display and the train headcode of IK20 stays at signal 109, the red signal.
08:08:32 – The oncoming train 2 occupied track circuit MZ and a red line appears on the
appropriate track display with the headcode 1A06 (the number associated with train 2).
08:08:34 – Auditory alarm ‘tweet’ sounds as rear of train 1 clears track circuit GD (i.e. the
track circuit before GE) and the track circuit is shown as cleared on track display.
08:08:36 – Track circuit GF occupied message displayed and auditory ‘tweet’ sounds (track
occupation alarm referring to the occupation of track circuit GF by train 1 – at the same time
a red line appears on the track layout on the track display).
08:08:41 – Rear of train 1 clears track circuit GE (i.e. the track circuit before GF) and track
circuit shows as cleared on track display.
08:08:42 – The rear of the oncoming train 2 clears track circuit MY and track circuit MY
shows as cleared on track display.
08:08:49 – Track circuit GG occupied by IK20 alarm message displayed and auditory ‘tweet’
sounds referring to track circuit GG by train 1 – at the same time a red line appears on the
track layout on the track display.
08:08:50 – Train 1 and train 2 collide.
Figure 1. A schematic of the relevant part of the track layout at Ladbroke Grove.
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8 The photograph in Figure 2 shows a signaller’s workstation, which comprises six
screens, a trackball and buttons, a keyboard and four telephones. The track displays can
be seen on the four screens from far right. These are similar to the track schematic shown
in Figure 1, only with increased complexity to reﬂect six tracks and the interconnections.
Notice also that the ‘alarm list’ is presented on the screen to the far left, which can easily
become ﬁlled with messages during an incident.
Unless the signaller happens to be looking directly at the appropriate point on the
alarm screen (on the far left screen in the workstation, shown in Figure 2), the ﬁrst he or
she will know of a new alarm is an auditory warning. There are four categories of visual
alarm and these are colour-coded yellow, blue, green and red, presented in that order from
top to bottom of the screen. Only those alarms that currently apply are displayed. All four
categories have the same auditory ‘tweet’, i.e. there is no diﬀerentiation of auditory
information, which means that the response to a ‘tweet’ is to search the alarm screen in
order to determine the type of alarm. The track occupation alarms are colour-coded in red
(the only warnings discussed in this paper) and appear at the bottom of the screen (the
reasons for this layout are historical and beyond the scope of this paper). When the
signaller had read the track occupation alarm, he would be aware that a train has overshot
the point at which it was supposed to stop. This may occur for a number of reasons. For
example, the track occupation alarm can also sound when trains are shunting (e.g. the
manoeuvring of carriages and train cabs along the track into and out of sidings). In this
case the alarm is false and the signaller will be expecting the alarm and be able to
acknowledge and ignore it. There are a few occasions on which the track occupation alarm
will be presented due to slight incompatibilities in the track circuit design and the direction
Figure 2. The signaller’s workstation.
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8 of train running. This means that occasional false alarms are displayed and the signaller
will be able to acknowledge the alarm and ignore it. On some occasions, the driver might
simply misjudge the stopping distance required by the train. This is a genuine alarm (i.e. an
alarm requiring intervention by the signaller – Stanton 1994); the driver normally calls the
signaller after the train has come to a halt. Most tracks have a safe overshoot area to cope
with this. For example, in the case being studied here, the signaller probably expected
the driver of train 1 to pull up within track segment GE in Figure 1, as was stated in the
testimony during the enquiry by the signaller: ‘In every other SPAD [signal passed at
danger] incident I have been involved in, the train involved has stopped within the overlap.
At the ﬁrst instant in the situation on 5 October 1999, I monitored the workstation,
expecting the train IK20 to stop. . .’ (Cullen 2000). In fact, if the driver of train 1 had
stopped at any point up to and including track segment GG, the accident would have been
avoided. Given this background information, it is possible that the signaller (on noting an
overshoot) could have sought conﬁrmation of the event, i.e. wait for an additional alarm
in order to conﬁrm that this was a ‘real’ train runaway event, or a call from the driver to
say that he or she had come to a halt within the safe overshoot area.
On only a tiny percentage of occasions the track occupation alarm will refer to a real
train runaway (typically only 1% of alarms will require any action by the signaller), when
a train has continued to run on a line for which it has not been cleared. This is a real
emergency. Fortunately, these occurrences are rare and it is possible for a signaller to have
never encountered a real event before. The eﬀects of the low positive predictive value
(PPV) of the alarm system have been shown to slow down the human reaction times
considerably, particularly below a PPV of 0.25 (Getty et al. 1995). If this does happen, the
signaller has to ﬁrst ﬁnd the track occupation on one of his four track displays and then
decide what course of action to take. If the signaller decides that this is a real case of a
runaway train, then they may have several alternative courses of action. These courses of
action may include sending a stop message to the train or any oncoming trains, switching
the points to send the train or oncoming trains onto an unoccupied track or changing the
signalling for oncoming trains.
All of these decisions, i.e. sending a stop message, switching the points and changing
the signals, require the signaller to read the track ahead of the train in order to decide if
there is an oncoming train and if either of the trains can be stopped in time. Good
situation awareness by the signallers, through information communicated via the displays
and/or interaction with other persons, is essential to help them reach the right decisions
(Stanton et al. 2006). Sending a stop message would require the assessment of the stopping
distance and the trajectory of the train(s). Moving the track points ahead of the train could
divert the train onto track 4 instead of track 2 (see Figure 1) to prevent an impending
collision, but the points can lock up when they detect a train is in the circuit in order to
prevent an inadvertent point change. Changing the signals from green to red requires the
signaller to anticipate the likely stopping distance of the oncoming trains. These are
complex decisions that have to be made by the signaller, who will be under considerable
time-stress. The signallers’ rule book does not give unequivocal guidance about which is
the best strategy; it just requires the signaller to ‘act immediately’. The question addressed
by the current paper was: ‘could the signaller have responded quicker than 18 s?’
2. A model of human alarm handling from other domains
The model of alarm initiated activity (AIA) shows potential pathways for human activity
involving alarms (Stanton 1994, Stanton and Baber 1995, Stanton and Edworthy 1999).
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8 The term ‘activities’ refers to the ensuing behaviours triggered by the occurrence of alarms.
It is assumed that these activities would not have been triggered without the alarm being
present; thus, they can be thought of as ‘alarm initiated activities’. This may be deduced by
asking people why they pursued one course of action over another in a particular situation
(assuming they know why and are being truthful); for example, if an individual is observed
to interrupt a task or change a strategy within a task. The AIAs are linked to other human
supervisory control activities that can be typiﬁed as continuous tasks (such as visual
scanning of track monitors) and discrete tasks (such as manual routing, dealing with
phone calls, updating logs, etc.). In these tasks, alarm information may be used instead of,
or in conjunction with, other information (e.g. data regarding weather conditions,
reference to track state, comments from other signalmen or reports from engineers who
are trackside).
The main stages of AIAs are as follows:
. Observation: the initial detection of the alarm.
. Acceptance: the act of acknowledging the presence of an alarm (usually pressing an
‘accept’ key to remove the highlighting as a physical acknowledgement that the
signaller has noted the presence of the alarm).
. Analysis: the initial assessment and prioritisation of the alarm. There are ﬁve
potential pathways that the activity can follow, as illustrated in Figure 3.
. Investigation: the activity directed at determining the underlying cause for the alarm.
. Correction: the stage at which the system controller implements their response to the
alarm condition.
. Monitoring: the assessment of success of the analysis, investigation and correction
activities.
. Resetting: extinguishing the alarm, returning it to its inactive state (usually pressing
a ‘reset’ key to remove the alarm from the display, as a physical acknowledgement
that the alarm condition has passed).
The stages and pathways of the AIA model are shown in Figure 3. The AIA model has
been used by other researchers. Shorrock and Scaife (2001) report on the use of the model
in the development of design principles for alarm systems in air traﬃc control. At a high
level, the air traﬃc controller’s tasks have some commonalities with the signaller’s tasks, as
both sets of tasks are concerned with the safe and eﬃcient movement of transportation
systems. Shorrock and Scaife comment that their work has ‘demonstrated the usefulness of
the model of AIA in the design and evaluation of alarm systems’ (Shorrock and Scaife
2001). More recently, in an overview of the whole ﬁeld of alarm handling, Bliss and Fallon
(2004) argue that the AIA model is particularly useful because it acknowledges cognitive
activities as well as physical actions. Other researchers have remarked on the relatively
small amount of observable actions, commenting that most of the time control room
operators are engaged in covert, cognitive activities (Wilson and Rajan 1995, Moray 1997,
Riera and Debernard 2003).
The alarm handling model in Figure 3 shows stages and pathways in alarm handling. It
is recognised that not all alarms are dealt with in exactly the same way, as the activities are
context dependent. After an alarm has been triggered, it may be observed and accepted by
the signaller, then some analysis of the likely trigger conditions is undertaken (which will
be highly dependent upon the situation awareness – Stanton et al. 2006). Depending on the
outcome of this analysis, one of ﬁve pathways could be followed, as indicated in Figure 3.
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These pathways include correcting the situation, monitoring the condition, resetting the
alarm, investigating the condition and exiting the analysis.
A literature search on human alarm handling in emergency events identiﬁed 13
research papers pertinent to the study in hand. The review revealed seven research papers
that dealt with reaction times to alarm events in aviation (Butcher et al. 1993, Bliss et al.
1995, Getty et al. 1995, Bliss 1997, Tyler 1997, Singer and Dekker 2000, Trujillo 2001), two
papers that reported reaction times in the nuclear industry (Roth et al. 1992, Hollywell and
Marshall 1994) and four papers that presented reaction times in process control (Kragt
1983, Moray and Rotenberg 1989, Stanton and Baber 1997, Stanton and Stammers 1998).
The studies reviewed ranged from simple tracking tasks with secondary alarm
handling, through simple simulations and alarm categorisation tasks, to full-scope task
simulation with critical events. Thus, the literature was not found to contain data directly
relevant to rail operations nor speciﬁcally to signal handling. It is proposed that, despite
obvious variation in context, it is feasible that for the elementary activities within the AIA
Figure 3. Stages in alarm initiated activities.
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8 framework, human performance can be compared across domains. There is considerable
variation in the reports of response times for human intervention in alarm initiative events,
from 1 s to 90 s.
The data from the review of the alarm handling response time literature (which
presented experimental data rather than real-world studies) were compiled into a table of
response times, based on the AIA model. The deﬁnitions of observation, acceptance,
analysis, investigation correction, monitoring and resetting were used to identify which
AIA(s) the research papers were referring to in their results. Although the authors of the
works may not have used these terms exactly, it was possible to deduce to which stages(s)
the response data they collected referred by using the AIA deﬁnitions. This made it
possible to identify the amount of time people take for diﬀerent aspects of the alarm
handling task, as summarised in Table 1. The minimum and maximum values of these data
are shown in Table 2, together with their respective cumulative totals. In order to produce
the timing estimates for each AIA reported in Table 2, the times for the previous stages
were subtracted. Thus, to get the time taken for the ‘accept’ stage, the time for the
‘observe’ stage was subtracted, and so on. A cumulative total was produced for each of the
columns of data. The ﬁgure in parentheses refers to the percentage that each activity
represents as a proportion of the total response time. Of the 13 studies, only six report data
on the completion of corrective actions (i.e. the studies of Kragt 1983, Moray and
Rotenburg 1989, Butcher et al. 1993, Stanton and Baber 1997, Tyler 1997, Trujillo 2001).
Only one of these studies reported a mean response time that was quicker than the
signaller, of 17.12 s compared to 18 s. Most of the reported response times were between
20 and 60 s. On this basis, the signaller’s response time of 18 s is comparable to the
shortest response times in the literature.
Table 2 illustrates the minimum and maximum times reported taken by each stage in
alarm initiated activity. The cumulative totals for minimum and maximum response
times are 17 s and 90 s respectively. The signaller’s response time of 18 s in the
Ladbroke Grove incident is at the quicker end of this range. The answer to the question
why the signaller took as long as 18 s rests on the idea that alarm handling involves a
series of activities that must be completed. If successful alarm handling consisted of only
observing the presence of an alarm and pressing an ‘alarm acceptance’ key then this
could take as little as 2 s. These activities only represent about 10–12% of the total
response time. If successful alarm handling required the analysis and corrective actions
as well, then this could take 11 s. If the alarm handling activities also require
investigative activities to be performed, as indeed the railway rule book prescribes,
the minimum response time will be 17 s. The reason for the increases in response time
are due to the analysis, investigation and correction phases being considerably more
demanding in terms of time requirements, which accounts for the remaining 88–90% of
the response time. This means that observing the presence of an alarm is not the same as
interpreting it and understanding it in the broader context of the system. Deciding upon,
and implementing, an appropriate course of action takes the bulk of the time in alarm
initiated activity in emergency events.
3. A multimodal critical path analysis model of human alarm handling
The multimodal critical path analysis (CPA) method has its roots in two traditions. CPA is
based in project management literature (e.g. Lockyer and Gordon 1991) and is used to
estimate the duration of a project in which some activities can be performed in parallel. It
is possible to apply these ideas to any time-based activity, such as human performance.
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In order to calculate CPA, one needs to know the order in which tasks are performed, their
duration and their dependency. The notion of dependency is, for traditional CPA, based
on the question of what tasks need to be completed before another task is allowed to
commence. When applied to human performance models, however, dependency oﬀers a
richer conceptual framework in that it allows consideration of parallel activity. Traditional
methods for modelling human response time are constrained because they do not represent
parallelism. For example, the keystroke level model method oﬀers a simple additive
method for calculating response times in computing tasks (Card et al. 1983). Using
concepts from CPA, it is possible to demonstrate how some activities can be performed in
parallel, which can provide more accurate estimates of performance time (Schweickert
1978, John 1990, John and Newell 1990, Gray et al. 1993, Baber and Mellor 2001). As
Gray and Boehm-Davis (2000) point out, the use of critical path models provides an
account of human behaviour that has the beneﬁt of a graphic notation (making it
relatively easy to see what is happening) and minimalist theory (making it easier to focus
on what they term ‘micro-strategies’ in task performance).
The question of how to address parallel activity is usually based on a multiple
attentional resource model. Wickens (1984) amalgamated a considerable amount of
research on multiple task performance to propose a theory of multiple attentional
resources. The theory proposes a general pool (or reservoir) of attentional resources,
which contains two sub-pools, one for spatial resources and one for verbal resources.
While the notion of multiple resources has not been without its critics (e.g. Spence and
Driver 1997, Vidulich and Tsang 2007), the implementation in this paper draws on the
assumption that physical actions can be assumed to be performed separately. Thus, the
present model uses a ‘light’ version of multiple-resource theory, in which physical actions
are treated as separate, but that cognitive actions are performed under a general level
(which might function like a ‘central executive’). Such a model would help to determine the
possibility of tasks being performed in series or parallel, i.e. two ‘visual’ tasks would need
to be performed in series (for the simple reason that one cannot look in two places at the
same time), but ‘auditory’ and ‘visual’ tasks could possibly be performed in parallel, e.g.
the (visual) monitoring of displays could be performed in parallel with the (auditory)
hearing of an alarm. Although the notion of diﬀerent resources provides some insight into
dependency, it is still essential to know the sequence of tasks and their relationship in order
to construct the CPA model.
The modelling of the signaller’s response times in the events from the presentation of
the ﬁrst signal passed at danger (SPAD) alarm is undertaken using cognitive CPA based
Table 2. Estimates of minimum and maximum response times (RT) for each stage of alarm
initiated activity with the percentage accounted for of total response time in brackets.
Alarm initiated
activity
Minimum
RT (s)
Cumulative
minimum (s)
Maximum
RT (s)
Cumulative
maximum (s)
Observation 1 (6%) 1 2 (2%) 2
Acceptance 1 (6%) 2 7 (8%) 9
Analysis 2 (12%) 4 6 (7%) 15
Investigation 6 (36%) 10 30 (33%) 45
Monitoring Variable* 10 Variable* 45
Correction 7 (40%) 17 45 (50%) 90
*No ﬁgures are entered for the monitoring task as it is diﬃcult to estimate these from the data – it is assumed that
monitoring is a continuous activity that can be performed in parallel with the other actions.
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Mellor (2001). The method may be proceduralised as follows.
(1) Analyse the tasks to be modelled: The tasks need to be analysed in ﬁne detail if they
are to be modelled by multimodal CPA. Hierarchical task analysis can be used to
specify the tasks, but it needs to be conducted down to the level of individual task
units. This ﬁne-grained level of analysis is essential if reasonable predictions of
response times are to be made. The result of this analysis is an initial sequencing of
the tasks in terms of their order of occurrence. This ordering deﬁnes the temporal
dependency of the model.
(2) Allocate sub-tasks to input/processing/output modality: Each unit task then needs
to be assigned to a modality. For the purposes of control room tasks (analysed by
the ﬁrst author), examples of these modalities are as follows:
(a) visual tasks: looking at the track displays, looking at the alarm screen and
looking at written notes and procedures;
(b) auditory tasks: listening for an auditory warning or listening to a verbal
request;
(c) central processing tasks: making decisions about whether or not to
intervene and selecting intervention strategies;
(d) manual tasks: typing codes on the keyboard, pressing button and moving
the cursor with the tracker ball;
(e) verbal tasks: talking on the phone, talking to another signaller in the
control room.
(3) Modify the sequence of tasks in terms of modality: Tasks that employ the same
modality, e.g. vision, cannot be performed in parallel; rather, one task in the
modality must be completed before the next can commence. This deﬁnes the
modality dependency of the model. Figure 4 shows a diagram for a simple activity.
Notice that the tasks are sequenced over time (from left to right) and deﬁned by
particular modalities (the diagram only shows four modalities but this is due only
to space constraints and one would normally show all relevant modalities in the
diagram).
(4) Allocate timings: Timings for the tasks are derived from a number of sources.
For the purposes of this exercise, the timings used are based on the human–
computer interaction (HCI) literature and are presented in Table 3. Just as
standard times have been taken for component AIA tasks in the previous section
to represent elemental human performance, so it is believed that unit tasks can be
assigned generic values. These times are based on underlying aspects of human
performance that are independent of context. In this model, the shortest time
that can be found in the literature has been taken because the study’s interest is
in deﬁning a minimum response time for the speciﬁc signal activity under
consideration.
(5) Construct the CPA diagram and calculate the critical path: Figure 4 shows the
preferred method of representation, i.e. action-on-node. In this format, each node
represents a task, as shown by the task name. The task has a deﬁned duration
(taken from Table 3). The early start time is deﬁned as the time for all preceding
tasks to be completed, i.e. it is the longest of the durations of previous tasks. The
early ﬁnish time is the sum of the early start and duration. The late ﬁnish time is the
time for all succeeding tasks to have started and the late start is the diﬀerence
between late ﬁnish and duration. Slack is the diﬀerence between the two start times.
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If slack ¼ 0, then the task lies on the critical path, otherwise the task is free to start
any time between the early and late start times. The total time is, therefore, the sum
of the durations of all tasks that lie on the critical path. A representation of a node
is also shown in Figure 4.
Based upon the CPA presented in Figure 5, the predicted time to undertake the
activities was around 19 s (i.e. 18.625 s). The model constructed for this analysis, and
shown in Figure 4, assumes that the signaller would seek to change the signal ﬁrst. Recall
that, in section 1.2, the possible causes of action for the signaller would include changing
the points, changing the signal and sending a stop message, and that the option for
changing the points was deemed unlikely in this case. An alternative model was
constructed (not shown in this paper due to space constraints) in which the actions of
‘change the signal’ and ‘send a stop message’ are exchanged in the time sequence. This
second model resulted in a time of around 24 s and the model that resulted in the shortest
time was chosen. According to Lawton and Ward (2005): ‘. . .there is no evidence that the
signaller sent an emergency stop message to the Turbo (train 1) driver’ – although there is
an indication that the request for such a message was recorded on verbal recordings. This
would seem to corroborate the assumption that the signaller opted for the fastest course of
action in this case.
This timing, of around 19 s, is derived by following the critical path task, which is
summarised in Table 4. These analyses seem to support the evidence in the previous
section, that it would take a signaller around 19 s to change signal SN120 from green to
red in response to the alarms associated with the runaway train at Ladbroke Grove. The
Figure 4. Critical path analysis representation.
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Figure 5. Critical path analysis of the signaller’s activities. SPAD ¼ signal passed at danger;
VDU ¼ visual display unit.
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CPA timings were based on published data of human response times in particular
activities, with the exception of the vocalisations. As with the AIA analysis in the previous
section, the CPA analysis demonstrates that the response to the SPAD warnings is rather
more involved than simply pressing a few keys. Most of the activities are visual and
cognitive, which account for 24 out of a possible 30 activities. Manual tasks account for
only four of the activities, which reinforces the ideas that alarm handling is predominantly
a cognitive activity. Interestingly, the pressing of the ACK key is not on the critical path
on either occasion and it has a relatively large ﬂoat time associated with it, suggesting that
this is not a crucial factor in the alarm handling performance of the signaller. Analysis of
the ‘micro-strategies’ (cf. Gray and Boehm-Davis 2000) suggests that the performance of
the signaller is less to do with key pressing and more to do with cognitive and visual
aspects of the tasks, as there are more of these activities on the critical path. Thus, it can be
Figure 5. (Continued).
Ergonomics 437
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [N
ev
ill
e.
S
ta
nt
on
@
br
un
el
.a
c.
uk
] A
t: 
09
:1
8 
21
 M
ar
ch
 2
00
8 
concluded that delays in the visual and cognitive activities are likely to have a bigger
impact on performance than delays in the alarm acknowledgement activities. The low
probability of the SPAD alarm relating to an actual SPAD (cf. Getty et al. 1995) might
explain why the signaller’s initial diagnosis assumed that the driver of the Turbo would
come to a halt after passing signal SN109. All previous experiences of the track occupation
alarm had shown this to be the case. It is likely, therefore, that the signaller revised this
diagnosis on receipt of the second alarm.
4. Conclusions from the modelling of alarm handling
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper suggests that it is possible to consider a
wide range of studies under a unifying model of human alarm handling. The data in the
model present the range of response times that may be expected. The CPAs show that a
conservative estimate of the signaller’s response time would be around 19 s. Evidence from
alarm response time data in the published literature (i.e. reports on simulated and
laboratory studies in other domains) suggest a minimum response time of 17 s. Unlike the
CPA, the AIA is a generic model of activity rather than being speciﬁc to any particular
circumstance. Taken together, the CPA and AIA models provide convergent evidence
from divergent modelling approaches. It is interesting to note that they arrived at
approximately the same response time, despite their diﬀering methodologies. The AIA
model presents a more general model of human activity than the CPA model. Both models
use data from the academic literature, rather than data speciﬁc to the railway industry.
Whether or not the models would perform in a similar manner in another domain remains
to be seen. On the basis of the evidence from the cognitive CPA and the published
literature in other domains, it is concluded that the signaller’s response time of
approximately 18 s appears to have been not just reasonable, but commendable, under
the circumstances. This research oﬀers some support for the use of time-based modelling
when evaluating the reaction time of people in emergencies. Future research should
Table 4. Critical path tasks and timings.
Tasks Start time Duration End time
Hear alarm 0 300 300
Search alarm page 300 2300 2600
Read SPAD message 2600 340 2940
Search VDU for train 2940 2300 5240
Identify train 5240 340 5580
Interpret train overlap 5580 990 6570
Monitor train 6570 340 6910
Search alarm page 6910 1300 8210
Read SPAD message 8210 340 8550
Search VDU for train 8550 1300 9850
Identify train 9850 340 10290
Diagnose Turbo 10290 990 11280
Search for conﬂict 11280 2300 13580
Diagnose conﬂict 13580 990 14570
Plan to change SN120 14570 990 15560
Locate SN120 15560 1300 16860
Move cursor 16860 1245 18105
Press CANCEL 18105 520 18625
SPAD ¼ signal passed at danger; VDU ¼ visual display unit.
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anticipate likely reaction times under deﬁned sets of circumstances.
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